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R E V ISI O NI S M

A BO U T

F R E E W I LL : A S TA TE M E NT & D EF E NS E

MANUEL VARGAS
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO
OCTOBER 2, 2008 | VER. 2.2B
ABSTRACT: This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in
Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer,
Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1)
motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard
incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic
status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of
compatibilism and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral
responsibility.
1.

R

evisionism about free will is the view that an adequate philosophical account of free will
requires us to jettison some aspects of our commonsense thinking about it. On this view,
free will is like a host of other concepts —including scientific, moral, and conventional

concepts— which we have revised to more accurately reflect our understanding of the world.
Scientific cases of concept revision are plentiful. Our concepts of water, light, and temperature have
undergone substantial, even radical change. But moral and conventional practices each offer a
number of compelling examples of their own. Consider the fact —or, at least, I hope it is a fact—
that we no longer conceive of marriage as a species of property exchange. For that matter, I take it
that adultery is no longer widely thought to include any acts of pre-marital sex by the adulterer. Less
salaciously, it is clear that calling David Blaine a magician does not commit us to the belief that he
has supernatural powers. And (on at least some accounts), use of racial categories does not commit
us to the existence of fundamental biological differences among human types. In each of these cases,
our concepts of these things underwent substantial revision in light of various social, moral, and
epistemic pressures. Conceptual change is thus a relatively common phenomenon, one that crops up
in a broad range of cases, ranging from natural to social to artifactual kinds, across scientific,
cultural, and moral categories. My contention is that like marriage, water, magicians, and adultery
were, free will is ripe for a conceptual overhaul. Or, to put the point a bit differently: I think we have
free will, but its nature is somewhat different that we often suppose.
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Revisionism is, in at least one sense, the new kid on the free will block. What I will attempt
to do here is to address some confusions that easily arise in the context of considering revisionism as
an alternative to more familiar and distinguished views about free will. To that end, I will (1) sketch
some motivations for revisionism about free will, (2) discuss some methodological complexities
raised by revisionism, and (3) reply to some objections, especially those recently raised by Michael
McKenna.1
2.

I

have maintained that an important and widespread aspect of our self-conception is that we
are agents of the sort libertarianism aims to describe. Many of us are at least implicitly
committed to a view that robust alternative possibilities are a pre-requisite for being apt targets

of responsibility-characteristic attitudes and practices, and some of us may be committed to much
stronger incompatibilist requirements (Fischer, Kane, Pereboom, & Vargas, 2007). So, with respect
to characterizing an important threat to folk ontology, I have incompatibilist sympathies.
Incompatibilism tends to strike many non-philosophers as obvious a description of their conceptual
commitments as one can find. Nevertheless, a not undistinguished fog2 of philosophers has argued
that this is an error or confusion, that upon careful inspection we are not and never really were
committed to incompatibilism.
Matters here are complex, both as an empirical matter about what people will assent to and
as a conceptual matter concerning the proper disentanglement of our conceptual and semantic
commitments. Here, I can only briefly gesture at some evidence for thinking an important thread of
ordinary thinking is committed to an incompatibilist picture of agency. In particular, I will highlight
three families of considerations that collectively suggest that a not insignificant portion of
commonsense has incompatibilist commitments with respect to free will: philosophical, cultural, and
experimental.
As I will use the term, ‘free will’ is the distinctive power or ability required for moral responsibility. As I read the
history of philosophy, this usage, one that links free will with moral responsibility is consistent with the bulk of at least
the post-Cartesian philosophical tradition, including such figures as Spinoza, Hume, Kant, and Nietzsche. Nevertheless,
I do not wish to deny that there are other conceptual roles that have been played by this term, and indeed, I will say a bit
about those alternative roles later in the paper.
2 My thanks to V. Alan White for coming up with the much-needed collective noun term for philosophers. It is clearly
superior to James Lipton’s earlier suggestion of a wrangle of philosophers, which despite its not insignificant charms,
strikes me as inadequate to the linguistic task, for it has failed to catch on as a linguistic convention, even among
philosophers and those who despise them.
1
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First, there is the familiar family of philosophical arguments, the most paradigmatic of which
is the Consequence Argument. I tend to regard the philosophical significance of these arguments as
somewhat different than is ordinarily intended by their proponents. That is, I do not take these
arguments to show something about the metaphysical structure of the world. Rather, I take these
arguments to constitute one kind of evidence for the conceptual commitments we have regarding
free will. I see no easy or unproblematic route from the intuitions that underpin the premises of the
Consequence Argument to conclusions about the metaphysics of free and responsible agency. What
I do see, though, is a reason for thinking that incompatibilists have captured an important aspect of
how we tend to understand the free-will-relevant notions of ability terms like ‘can’. The naturalness
of incompatibilist-friendly readings of the various premises strongly suggests that even if alternative
readings are possible, these alternatives do an inferior job of capturing a core or central aspect of
those concepts, at least as they are implicated in freedom and responsibility.3
A second source of support for incompatibilism about folk concepts comes from (at least,
but not exclusively) popular Western religious commitments. There is considerable complexity to
the theological tradition in the West, but there is also a clear and influential strand of religious
thinking that treats free will, understood in an incompatibilist sense, as the only thing adequate for
getting God off the hook for the world’s evils. These convictions are often intertwined with an
implicit commitment to a dualist metaphysics. (Dualism raises issues of its own; for example, it is
not obvious that dualism of one or another sort does any better at securing non-problematic,
genuine, alternative-possibilities supporting agency.) These considerations will surely seem marginal
or trivial in the context of the thoroughly secular culture of contemporary analytic philosophy. But I
write this in a country where the vast majority of non-philosophers (most estimates put the number
at around 90%) confess to having religious beliefs. My suggestion is that popular religious
convictions reflecting these influential theological commitments may be one historical source of this

This point can be accepted by someone who thinks, for example, that a Lewis-style counterfactual account is the best
way to properly understand the involved abilities claims, and that given this, Consequence Argument-style arguments fail
to show the advertised metaphysical conclusion. The matter is somewhat delicate, however. One could think that the
failure of the Consequence Argument on a Lewisian account of counterfactuals shows that Lewis’ account fails to
capture some important features of ordinary thinking about abilities. The significance of this result would depend on the
extent to which existing folk patterns of ability talk are a constraint on the adequacy of the Lewisian story. However, if a
Lewis-style account of ability claims is not so constrained, then one might advocate a revisionist conception of free will
on the basis of our ordinary thinking failing to reflect the proper (Lewis-style) analysis of ability.
3
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conceptual content, and moreover, that these religious convictions plausibly provide an ongoing
narrative that reinforces those convictions.4
A third reason for thinking that incompatibilist convictions are central to a good deal of
thinking about responsibility is rooted in ongoing experimental work on people’s willingness to
attribute free will and moral responsibility. Here, it is important to recognize that the data are
complex and that the results point to some interesting bifurcations in the responses of experimental
populations when it comes to attributions of free will, moral responsibility, praise, and blame. One
thing that does seem clear, though, is that we do not get to make any sweeping claims about how all
the folk are all of the time compatibilist, or all of the time incompatibilist (Nahmias, Morris,
Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2006; Nichols & Knobe, 2007). That is, the data consistently show that,
depending on the experimental conditions, anywhere from 1/4 to 1/3 of the subjects will skew in
some way contrary to the majority opinion. And, notably, under some conditions one gets
predominantly compatibilist-favoring results, while in other conditions the results are
incompatibilist-favoring. So, for example, prompts using low-emotion, abstract, or general
characterizations of agents and their actions tend to generate incompatibilist responses. In contrast,
prompts deploying singular, concrete cases that elicit emotional reactions tend to generate
compatibilist reactions. Notably, though, when asked to describe what sort of universe is most like
ours, given a choice between a deterministic one and one in which agents are non-deterministic,
subjects overwhelmingly choose the indeterministic conception (Nichols & Knobe, 2007).
From a revisionist standpoint, I take all of this to be good news. Even if it turns out that we
have mixed commitments —compatibilist commitments sometimes, incompatibilist commitments
other times— as long as there are consistently conditions under which a not insignificant number of
us have genuinely incompatibilist commitments, then it seems correct to say that some important
aspect of our ordinary commitments is genuinely incompatibilist.
What should we make of the possibility of a fragmented concept? This is a complex matter5,
one more complex than I let on in Four Views on Free Will, and certainly one that deserves more
detailed attention that I can give it here. Part of the complexity of the matter hinges on the account
of concepts one accepts. So, for example, it matters whether we accept a representationalist,
Given the diversity of theological views on these matters, one might wonder why it is that a specifically incompatibilist
conception of these things might have taken root. An admittedly speculative reply: there are a variety of confusions
about our agential powers that easily arise from reflection on our phenomenology of decision making, and these
confusions provided the fertile soil for reception of incompatibilist and not compatibilist strands of the theological
tradition.
5 For some of the issues involved, see (Nelkin, 2007; Doris, Knobe, & Woolfolk, 2007; Knobe & Doris, In press).
4
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inteferential, Fregean sense, or 2-D account of concepts, and whether and how such concepts are
structured. Still, it may be useful to make a few general remarks about what I have in mind by
describing the folk concept as incompatibilist, and to explain why it is that even in the face of the
possibility conceptual fragmentation I believe the incompatibilist is well off.
What I said in Four Views on Free Will was that I take it that if it turns out that there really are
strands of commonsense thinking that are incompatibilist, then this is good news for incompatibilist
accounts of our commonsense, and bad news for compatibilist accounts. I still think this picture is
basically correct. However, a critic could reply that it is not the compatibilist’s burden to knock
down every conception of freedom and responsibility found in our ordinary concept: all that matters
is that there is an important one that is part of our ordinary folk way of thinking and is compatible
with determinism. Indeed, this is just what Michael McKenna has argued (this journal, ms 8).
This line of criticism raises a number of important methodological issues that can, I think,
help illuminate some issues lurking below the surface of many disagreements in the free will
literature. Let us start with the burden faced by the compatibilist, according to McKenna. McKenna
thinks that the compatibilist’s job, on the matter of describing the folk concept, is done if he or she
can point to a compatibilist construal of our convictions. But such a position seems unstable, as he
seems to unwilling to give the incompatibilist a similar standard of success. McKenna explicitly
rejects the possibility that the incompatibilist has done his or her job by identifying one consistent
strand of ordinary convictions. But on this matter there are special reasons that favor the
incompatibilist’s presumption, and not the view expressed by McKenna.
First, recall that by incompatibilist lights it is not enough to note that there are concepts of
freedom, and perhaps notions of responsibility that intelligibly deserve those labels. As numerous
incompatibilists have long acknowledged, there are plenty of senses of freedom, and perhaps of
responsibility, that are compatible with determinism (Kane, 1996; Pereboom, 2001; Strawson, 1994;
Smart, 1961). What is at stake, at least in the mainstream of philosophical work on free will, is the
kind of freedom that is the distinctive mark of responsible agency and attendant judgments of
deservingness of moralized praise and blame.
Now let us assume we’re all on the same page: the sense of free will at stake is the sense of
control or ability that is distinctively the mark of responsible agency. The second point is this: the
folk conceptual incompatibilist ordinarily thinks that what picks out the property of free will in the
world, whatever that comes to, is going to be settled by, at least in part, our thinking about free will.
And, the incompatibilist ordinarily thinks, the way we figure this out is by looking at our concepts.
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However, we do not have a good account of our shared concepts if we just start excising those
elements that we do not like, even the ones that strike us as baroque or peculiarly demanding. Of
course, if some or another commitment is just an element of one person’s thinking and no one else,
that commitment is poorly suited to make a claim on being our shared concept. But if you can easily
get lots of people —or university undergraduates, at any rate— to vigorously agree with you under
suitable conditions, then it looks like you’ve got a candidate for a real part of one’s conceptual
commitments. Alternately, we might say such a process yields data about prima facie contributors to
semantic content. Now here is a remarkable result: the data show that, in some conditions,
apparently libertarian self-descriptions run in the 90% range, and even in the least favorable
conditions such reactions tend to appear in no less than 1/4 of the respondents (Nahmias et al.,
2006; Nichols & Knobe, 2007). So, even if you thought we have conceptual fragmentation on free
will, whether in the form of multiple concepts or merely a single inconsistent concept, it should be
clear that there are conditions under which the incompatibilist strand is consistently and even
overwhelmingly manifest in judgments of responsibility. So, even if there are conditions under
which we really are compatibilists, the compatibilist will have hardly secured what he or she
endeavors to secure if there are also a substantial number of conditions under which we are
manifestly not compatibilists (Honderich, 1988; Smilansky, 2000).6
Here, it is important to add that what the incompatibilist is maintaining is that we are talking
about the concepts of free will and moral responsibility, and not merely someone’s conceptions of
these things. That is, depending on your favorite view of concepts, we are talking about the broad
overlap of semantic, representational, causal, or inferential structures, structures which themselves
permit of an array of tokenings whose precise content is more and less elaborated. So, the
incompatibilist maintains, incompatibilism is a clear feature of the concepts of free will and moral
responsibility. Event-causal, non-causal, or agent causal libertarianism are arguably conceptions or
theories that articulate the most promising ways of understanding the concept, in much the same
way as Rawls’ account of justice as fairness is a particularly promising conception of the broader
shared concept of justice.7

Of course, one could accept this basic point and go on to argue that we would do well to excise those incompatibilist
elements. So, perhaps the fragmentation of the folk requires a repair in a uniformly compatibilist way. I find this solution
a compelling one, but it does not help the compatibilist on the matter of whether or not some of ascriptions of free will
and moral responsibility really do, as matter of folk conceptual ontology, appeal to incompatibilist commitments.
7 Of course, internal to incompatibilists one might argue over whether the concept of free will has enough content to
specify a particular type of libertarianism. So, for example, I take it that Tim O’Connor thinks that Kane’s libertarianism
6
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Now at this point the compatibilist might justifiably reject any number of parts about this
picture. Perhaps there is an error in folk attributions of responsibility when incompatibilist
judgments are manifest. Or, perhaps it is an error to suppose that such judgments reveal anything
about a shared concept of free will or moral responsibility. But crucially, the compatibilist needs to
offer an argument for why, when doing conceptual analysis, broadly speaking, we get to disregard
some elements widespread in ordinary convictions, convictions that consistently show up in
identifiable conditions in large numbers of people. Without an argument —and I am not aware of
any having been advanced in the literature— it will surely look like the compatibilist is engaged in,
well, “petty word-jugglery”; or to mix metaphors, the compatibilist is cherry-picking strands
favorable to the compatibilist view and neglecting those elements of our thinking that disfavor it.
These considerations also generate a defeasible reason to think that the compatibilist cannot simply
retreat to a defense internal to antecedent acceptance of a compatibilist viewpoint. In the face of
existing data, there is simply too much that points to ubiquitous and pervasive strands of
incompatibilist intuitions in our shared thinking about responsibility. These considerations, when
combined with reflections on the Western popular religious cultural heritage, and philosophical
considerations of the sort delivered by the Consequence Argument and its ilk, all suggest the folk
concept is rightly described as significantly incompatibilist in a way problematic for traditional
compatibilists.8

3.

is revisionist precisely because he thinks that Kane conception of free will in fact fails to capture a genuine feature of the
concept of free will. I’ve discussed this issue in more detail elsewhere, in (Vargas, 2005a), esp. pp. 418-419.
8 Here, I am ignoring some complexities concerning the principal of alternative possibilities and the numerous purported
counterexamples to it, as well as the myriad of replies and counter-replies to those examples. Suffice it to say that I am
not persuaded by Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). In brief: the only
examples that are not dialectically problematic are either unpersuasive or so complex as to make clear intuitions
impossible (at least for me). However, even if PAP must ultimately be abandoned I think it is likely that there is very
likely a nearby principle that is best rendered in incompatibilist terms. Moreover, on the account of folk thinking I have
suggested, the existence of counterexamples to a general principle of alternative possibilities would not show that there
are never conditions under which folk thinking about free will and moral responsibility genuinely do invoke a principle of
alternative possibilities understood in some libertarian-friendly way. But if I am wrong about both of the preceding, I
still think the strength of independent arguments for incompatibilism is such that all this would show is that I’ve
misidentified the dominant incompatibilist element in folk thinking (i.e., “leeway” instead of “source” incompatibilist
intuitions), not that folk thinking does not have strongly incompatibilist elements.
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W

hy advise that we revise? The motivating idea for my proposal of conceptual revision
is two-fold. First, an adequate picture of human agency should be one that is
plausible, given a broadly scientific view of the world. Unfortunately, our

commonsense understanding of ourselves as free and responsible agents is not plausible in this way.
I think that many libertarians, and especially Robert Kane, have done an excellent job of describing
what must be true of our agency for us to make good on a widespread set of convictions about free
will. The trouble is there is no principled reason to think that our agency, and in particular, the
physical systems underpinning our agency, are indeed built in the way described by Kane and other
libertarians. Speculative metaphysics has an unimpressive track record, and wishing our agency had
indeterminism located in just the right places and none of the wrong places provides us with no
reason for thinking that we have so fortuitous an alignment between phenomenology, the moments
of moral concern, our causal powers, and the conditions of their collective realizers. Indeed, not
only is there no evidence for the most plausible accounts offered by sober-minded libertarians, there
is some positive reason to regard the proposed pictures with skepticism. Neuroscientists tend
towards skepticism about free will precisely because of doubts that a non-problematic picture of
indeterminism will emerge from their work.9
This disheartening situation leads to a second, and I think, more profound concern about
our libertarian self-image, a concern about the moral status of our practices in light of the
dubiousness of our self-image. To the extent to which we have social practices of blame and
punishment that reflect our conceptions of agents, we have an obligation to account for the
justification of those practices. However, if we are unlikely to have the kind of agency we suppose is
required for the justification of those practices, it appears that we are in the morally precarious
position of inflicting blame and punishment without adequate license. Unfortunately, this is precisely
the position we find ourselves in. Our self-image is committed to the existence of genuine, robust
alternative possibilities at nearly every moment when we are making a purportedly free choice. And,
in everyday thinking, it is precisely this sort of ability to do otherwise that provides part of the
justification for praise and blame. In the absence of such possibilities, goes the received view, moral

Much of the neuroscientific literature on these matters tends to be conceptually flat-footed, failing to recognize some
rudimentary distinctions about deliberation, considerations, and the like. And, more often than not, neuroscientists are
simply blind to the possibility of non-incompatibilist understandings of agency. So, I hesitate to lean too heavily on this
literature. Still, I think it is notable that few if any neuroscientists seem sanguine about the picture Kane advocates.
9
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praise and blame lose their justification.10 So, here’s the rub: when we are honest about the evidence
for our having libertarian agency, we find a dearth of evidence to support our convictions. But,
given that our convictions seems to do some work in our actual practices, we folk libertarians are
faced with a deeply unpalatable consequence: we advocate blame and punishment in cases where we
have no good evidence for assuming that people have met the requirements for blame and
punishment. Clearly, we need a better account of blame and punishment than a hope and a prayer.
This is where I take moderate revisionism to offer an alternative to (1) libertarianism, which
seems to me an unwarrantedly optimistic view, (2) traditional forms of compatibilism (including, on
my view, semicompatibilism), which must attribute to large numbers of people a systematic
confusion between what they explicitly espouse and what they in fact believe is required of a range
of moral judgments and practices, and (3) eliminativist views such as hard incompatibilism, which I
take to too readily reject what can be repaired. Moderate revisionism about free will provides an
alternative to each of these pictures, by showing how free and responsible agency is likely, (although
at some cost to some widespread conceptions of it) and how a proper understanding of it can show
that we are ordinarily licensed in our judgments of responsibility and the social practices that flow
from our judgments.
A key to offering a better alternative to other, more distinguished accounts is to begin by coopting what is best about existing accounts of free will. So, for example, I advocate understanding
free will as a power or capacity bound up in a form of agency marked by sensitivity to moral
considerations. However, a second key is to provide an account of the moral justification of praise
and blame. As I see it, one thing that justifies the responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes
is that these things foster our moral considerations-responsive agency. Together, these two ideas
generate an account that explains why moral responsibility is important, and an account of how free
will is possible within a broadly scientific conception of agency in the causal world.

I have focused on the ideas of praise, blame, and punishment, but it is worth reminding ourselves that our conception
of free will may have consequences that extend considerably further than these familiar notions, considered in
themselves. I take it that, for example, attitudes towards homeless people, and drug addiction of some stripes, may
reflect judgments about the freedom or responsibility of the considered agents for these conditions. If one thinks that
free will is pervasive and the kind of thing that represents an unassailable ability to always transcend local motivational
inputs, and we have reason to think this picture is false, this could conceivably alter how at least some people regard
some conditions of homelessness and alcoholism.
One might also think that these considerations suggest that there are important strands of our thinking about
agency that go beyond the alternative possibilities requirement that I have discussed, such as “source” incompatibilist
intuitions, or intuitions grounded in our being at least partly non-physical substances. All of these are possibilities to
which I am sympathetic. If these strands really are substantially present in our ordinary thinking, they point to further
reasons for the kind of moderate revisionism I favor.
10
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One virtue, I think, of the revisionist conception of things is that it helps to get rid of the
impulse to view all non-incompatibilist accounts as “wretched subterfuges” or “quagmires of
evasion.” Moderate revisionists, unlike traditional compatibilists, need not insist that ordinary,
otherwise competent concept users somehow fail to realize that they do not really have
incompatibilist intuitions. To the extent to which a moderately revisionist account of responsibility
prescribes an ultimately compatibilist revision of commonsense, it does so in a way that recognizes
the existence (but also, the limitations) of incompatibilist convictions.
Revisionism, as a methodological approach, may also help us see how to put compatibilist
and incompatibilist theories into a more direct dialogue over (1) what, precisely, is at stake in our
concern for free will and moral responsibility, and (2) what methods are available to us for resolving
disputes about what is at stake. So, for example, moderate revisionism takes seriously the idea that
we must distinguish the business of clarifying our presumptions (something akin to conceptual
analysis) from the business of determining a normatively adequate conception of agency that can
account why we ought to hold agents responsible. Incompatibilists have tended to focus on the first,
seeking to isolate and explain the particular semantic or conceptual commitments with currency in
ordinary thinking. In doing so, they have tended to highlight particularly demanding elements of our
concept. In contrast, compatibilists have tended to do well in reflecting on the kinds of agency
required to sustain justified normative practices. However, compatibilists have done comparatively
poorly at acknowledging the concerns located in the incompatibilist strands of common sense. Each
side has sought to spin out a theory of free will by attending to only one half of the story, and taking
that half of the story to be the complete story. It is this implicit difference in focus —a dialectical
disconnect, if you will— that partly accounts for the sensation one sometimes gets that
incompatibilists and compatibilists are talking past one another, failing to understand the
motivations of the other side.11 When this is compounded with some methodological differences
frequently found with each camp, the sense of dialectical disconnect becomes especially profound.
So, for example, incompatibilist metaphysicians have often worked from a picture of metaphysics
(from at least P.F. Strawson to David Lewis) that accepted a norm of descriptive metaphysics, one
that sought to avoid conflict with commonsense, even at significant ontological cost. In contrast,

Honderich and Smilansky have separately argued that compatibilism and incompatibilism both only tell part of the
story about free will and moral responsibility (Honderich, 1988; Smilansky, 2000). My account is different than their
respective discussions of the dialectical disconnect in an important way. They have focused on differences in the content
of different conceptual strands. In addition to this difference, I have emphasized the importance of distinct foci
(metaphysical vs. normative) and the attendant methodological presuppositions.
11
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compatibilists —at least those with a foot in normative theory— have taken on board suppositions
common to normative ethics. In contrast to the program of descriptive metaphysics, here there is
widespread acceptance of the inevitability of abandoning some fundamental moral intuitions in the
service of reflective equilibrium.
Moderate revisionism brings these disparate frameworks of concern and methodology into a
unified picture. On the one hand, it permits a role for descriptive inquiry. On the other hand, it
separates this issue off from the matter of prescriptive theorizing about free will and moral
responsibility. In doing so, it provides a way to conceive of the relationship of commonsense to
philosophical theorizing without treating philosophical theorizing as merely a project of reifying
historically contingent, culturally inherited, pre-scientific prejudices.

4.

A

s useful as it can be to focus on methodology, we should not lose sight of the principal
project, i.e., an account of how we ought to think about free will. Regardless of one’s
convictions about the structure and commitments of folk thinking, we can agree or

dispute the accompanying positive proposal of how we ought to conceive of free will. That is, while
my account’s status as genuinely revisionist or not depends in part on how things sort out in the
characterization of folk thinking about free will and responsibility, the success or failure of the
philosophical prescription I offer is, in principle, independent of the matter of revisionism.
McKenna argues that “the tough methodological problem for Vargas is that he has to be
fairly certain that the cards fall for the incompatibilist about the ordinary concept before he can
proceed to cut away” (ms 7-8, in this volume). If what McKenna means is that my account is not
revisionist unless I am right that the ordinary concept is incompatibilist, then I agree. And, I take it
that considerations of the sort I mention in the preceding section make my construal of common
sense a plausible one. However, I fail to understand why my account is faced with a uniquely tough
methodological problem. That is, I fail to see why I need to be any more certain than any one else
with a view about commonsense thinking about free will—traditional compatibilist, libertarian, hard
incompatibilist, or otherwise. If, for example, libertarians are wrong about whether folk thinking is
libertarian, this is a prima facie problem precisely because libertarians regularly appeal to folk
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thinking for justification in the libertarian metaphysics they propound.12 Similarly, a broad swath of
compatibilists would surely be dismayed for their accounts if they could become convinced that folk
thinking about free will was not, in fact, compatibilist. One could defend one’s compatibilism or
incompatibilism at this point by appealing to the idea that in either case there is an important
difference between the folk and the correct philosophical account, and that the latter rightly departs
from the former. And, indeed, I think this move is an important one to make, one that makes my
form of revisionism possible. But such a move would be a further move, and importantly, it would
mark out a different sort of position on the relationship between folk convictions and philosophical
theories than one tends to find in conventional accounts of free will and moral responsibility.
However, suppose McKenna is right. Suppose that revisionism faces a uniquely high
standard of credence in its account of the folk, and suppose that this standard cannot be met. At this
point, there is a very natural fallback position for my account: conditional revisionism. That is, if the
chips fall a certain way, then revisionism comes alive. In the absence of suitable levels of credence
about what way the chips fall, we develop the best going account we can that is prepared to walk
away from various intuitions. I take it that this is all we need to justify pursuit of a theory with the
various theoretical and methodological convictions that drive this account. And, of course, there are
plenty of theorists who do think our concept of free will is incompatibilist, and thus, the account I
offer should seem especially appealing to these folks precisely as a fallback position that does not
reify groundless or metaphysically troubled aspects of common sense.
As I indicated above, I am concerned with an account of free will, understood as the control
or ability condition on moral responsibility. The conceptual role of moral responsibility is one of
guiding the organization, coordination, and justification of differential moralized treatment of one
another. Preserving these inferential roles is what anchors any proposed revision; it is what blocks
the charge of arbitrariness or the possibility that we might now revise in some direction radically
disconnected from the candidate concept, as we now understand it. On this approach then, free will
is roughly the distinctive control or power whose presence or absence licenses responsibilitycharacteristic judgments, practices, and attitudes. And, I think, the most promising account of this
power is one that invokes the idea of a set of uncontroversial basic agential elements (beliefs, desires,
intentions, instrumental reason) plus (1) sensitivity to specifically moral considerations and (2) the
capacity to govern one’s conduct in light of those considerations, i.e., moral considerations-sensitive
agency.
12
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In very general terms, this account is an instance of a reason-based account of free will, of
which John Martin Fischer’s account is perhaps the most richly developed and extensively discussed.
There are a number of important differences between my account and those favored by others,
including Fischer. Here, I will not dwell on those differences. Instead, I will focus on only one
aspect distinctive of my account: the special role given to how moral considerations-responsive
agency structures the aims and practices of moral responsibility, and consequently, free will. As I see
it, the responsibility system —that collection of responsibility-characteristic practices, attitudes, and
judgments— is justified by the way it contributes to the cultivation of a particularly valuable,
perhaps intrinsically valuable form of agency, i.e., our moral considerations-responsive agency.
Assessments of responsibility are not merely reactions we have to one another, even if they are
partly that. These assessments are part of a system whose justification and normative organization is
generated by the role these assessments play in contributing to the development of moral
considerations-sensitive agency.13 Over time, and given widespread participation in the responsibility
system by agents of the relevant sort, the ubiquity of this form agency is increased and its
capaciousness is enhanced. It is this fact that largely justifies the perpetuation of the general system
of responsibility practices, attitudes, and judgments.
Importantly, this general, higher-order fact need not be something of which we are ever
aware when we make judgments of responsibility. Instead, we have a panoply of first-order moral
norms to which we appeal for the justification of praising and blaming. I get angry with you for
being inconsiderate to me. I judge you responsible for that very reason. In doing so, I do not
ordinarily appeal to more global normative facts. Nevertheless, those global or systemic facts are
important to explaining the justification of our first order practices.
Consider an analog from the law. What makes you deserve a fine for speeding, we ordinarily
judge, is that you broke the law against speeding. However, this first order judgment can be backed
by a higher normative claim that never crosses your mind; one thing that can make such a law
justified is the role that the cultural currency of such a law has in our society. In ordinary
circumstances, when we have no need to question the justification of the law, we have no need to
invoke or even consider these matters. We take the law to be justified, we see that it has been
broken, and we take these things to license a judgment in favor of a fine. This is not to deny that we
We might also understand the system as “aiming at” (i.e., being justified in its operations, as a whole, to the extent to
which it achieves the following results) the enhancement of agent’s sensitivity to considerations where such agency
already exists, as well as expanding the number of contexts in which we are considerations-sensitive agents (Vargas, in
progress).
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can, when engaging in the study of the law or deliberating about the proper norms governing its
implementation, find matters considerably more complex. Judgments of mitigation in both law and
morality are thorny matters that are pervasive in our implementation of both legal and moral
judgments. At any rate, my contention is that the normative integrity of first-order responsibility
characteristic practices, attitudes, and judgments is, generally, minimally secured by the role that such
(usually non-consequentialist) first order judgments play in an overall moral ecology, one aimed at
fostering moral considerations-sensitive agency.14
Free will, then, just is those twin capacities required for the apprehension of moral
considerations and for self-governance in light of those considerations. On this account of free will,
we can explain why it is important and why it has been rightly viewed as so closely tied to moral
responsibility. Moreover, we can appreciate how such capacities can be common among ordinary
agents. Finally, assuming we can find a way to square talk of considerations or reasons with a
broadly naturalistic understanding of the universe, we can appreciate how our being free and
responsible agents is compatible with various intuitive threats to free will, including determinism.
In advocating this picture of free will, I do not mean to pretend that it fully captures all the
threads of ordinary thinking about it. Still, if we are willing to make some cautious departures from
common sense, we can —without simply changing the subject— bring theorizing about free will
more in line with the general trajectory of broadly naturalistic inquiry into human beings, one that
requires us to modify our self-image in exchange for a deeper understanding of our place in nature.
That’s what moderate revisionism gives us a way to achieve with our concept of free will.

This account is not meant to preclude the possibility of other, overlapping accounts of the justification of moral
responsibility. Rather, it is meant to provide a minimal justificatory story that can be widely accepted on a range of
independently plausible accounts of normative ethics. Moreover, I take it that this justificatory story gives us an analysis
of what would justify the desert claims that are platitudinously invoked in responsibility ascriptions, even if (again), the
correct account of the “real” normative structure of those desert claims turns out to be somewhat different than we
ordinarily suppose. Thus, for example, I reject Pereboom’s conception of “basic desert” if, by that, he means a
substantive account of desert that requires that desert is warranted by nothing more than the agent and the action, devoid
of any further normative facts including social context and the broader normative significance of that act in a system of
human practices. However, if Pereboom just means by “basic desert” the actual property of desert (or the best candidate
properties) picked out by successful platitudinous usages of full-blooded desert attributions in the context of
responsibility, then I take it that the two-tiered justificatory story I have offered just is a candidate account for the sense
of basic desert involved in responsibility. In either case, my account cannot be rejected simply on the grounds that one
favors an alternative conception of desert. What is needed is an argument for why, if basic term is not meant as piece of
substantive stipulation, this account cannot be an account of basic desert; alternately, if ‘basic desert’ is meant to pick out
a substantive stipulation, we need an argument why we should think basic desert, as opposed to the “successful
platitudinous referent of fundamental desert attributions” sense of desert is the with which we are rightly concerned in
discussions of responsibility. That the former has a pithier label is hardly a reason for thinking it is the sense of desert
with which we are rightly concerned.
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5.

B

y way of conclusion, I wish to briefly address three issues provoked by Michael
McKenna’s insightful reflections on Four Views on Free Will (in this journal): the nature of
semicompatibilism, whether every account is really revisionist, and the matter of realism

about free will and moral responsibility. Focusing on these issues can, I think, illuminate some of the
commitments and attractions of the account I recommend.
Begin by considering what are we arguing about. I claimed that what is at stake in
mainstream debates is the freedom required for moral responsibility. These matters are not
unconnected to my claim that the terminological distinction between semicompatibilism and
compatibilism obscures matters more than it clarifies them. If the freedom we are arguing about is
the freedom required for moral responsibility, then Fischer and McKenna are firmly in the
mainstream of traditional forms of compatibilism in that they maintain that such freedom is
compatible with determinism, irrespective of what they say about other notions of freedom ruled out by
determinism. Again— neither incompatibilist nor compatibilists have ever needed to deny that there
can be some sense in which freedom is ruled out by determinism and some sense in which it is not.
Thus, making a concession regarding some sort of freedom not required for moral responsibility is
neither here nor there with respect to what most compatibilists and incompatibilists take themselves
to be arguing about. So, the semicompatibilist’s concession about the Consequence Argument
showing that determinism rules out “an important sense of the ability to do otherwise” is not itself a
notable concession in the dialectic over free will unless we go on to argue that its importance is one
relevant for moral responsibility, given that this is what we are supposed to be talking about. Similar
remarks are relevant for McKenna’s distinguishing between “actual sequence,” or actualist, forms of
compatibilism (such as those admirably defended by Fischer and by McKenna) and counterfactualist
forms of compatibilism (such as classical conditional analysis compatibilists and work by more
sophisticated contemporary proponents such as Michael Smith and Kadri Vihvelin). In the former
case counterfactuals only play an evidential role with respect to free will. In the latter case, those
counterfactuals play a constitutive role for free will.
Let me be clear: I certainly do not deny that actualist compatibilist accounts, such as
Fischer’s and McKenna’s have made important and original contributions to our understanding of
free will. Nor, am I denying that an actualist account is different from the conditional analysis part
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of the compatibilist tradition. However, as far as I can tell, there is no disagreement between
compatibilists and semicompatibilist, nor between actualist and counterfactualist compatibilists on
whether the freedom required for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. And,
pointing to a difference between actualist and counterfactualist compatibilisms about what, precisely,
is required for a positive compatibilist account of freedom does not change this fact. Indeed, it is
worth remembering that actualist compatibilism has a distinguished history of its own. For example,
Frankfurt and Strawson were both actualist compatibilists: neither invoked alternative possibilities as
a requirement for moral responsibility, and it would be perverse to insist that their accounts are not
pillars of the compatibilist tradition. Indeed, their accounts are arguably the defining accounts of
compatibilism in the second half of the 20th century. So, although actualist compatibilism is distinct
and important, I am denying both that what distinguishes semicompatibilists from compatibilists in
general is the concession to incompatibilism of alternative possibilities of a sort not required for
moral responsibility, and what seems entailed by McKenna’s defense of semicompatibilism, i.e., that
actualism did not have a distinguished history amongst compatibilists prior to the advent of John
Fischer’s rightly influential work. In this, the semi of semicompatibilism is like the semi of a semitruck: it marks a particularly prominent instance of the kind, but an instance of the general kind
nevertheless. All of which is to say that we also should not lose track of what the mainstream of the
debate is about, and indeed, what compatibilism is usually taken to be about: the kind of power or
agency required for being rightly blamed and praised in those characteristically moralized ways.
I do not want to pretend as though there are not other things, beyond concerns with morally
responsible agency, that have a plausible claim on being an instance of the free will problem. Indeed,
I strongly doubt that there is a single free will problem, or anything that adequately unifies the range
of things that have at various times been considered under the label. We might, for example, be
worried about deliberative agency, or whether we have the powers we must believe ourselves to have in
order to deliberate and not have false beliefs when we deliberate (this seems to be Searle’s worry, for
example). Or, we might be worried about strong agency, or whether we have the kind of agency
required for robust self-control, and perhaps characteristically human powers such as creativity and
originality in decision-making (Nozick, for example, seemed to be worried about some of these
issues). Or, we might be worried causal contributor agency, or worried about whether we make a genuine
contribution to the causal order, whatever that comes to (I take it that one strand of Nagel’s
concerns are located here). Moreover, these concerns need not be tied only to determinism, but
could also be generated by independent worries about mechanism or physicalism or causal
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explanations of human action or reductionism, and so on. In different ways, each combination of
interest in some form of agency and some metaphysical or causal threat to that agency has a
plausible claim on the label of a problem of free will. But it is also important to recognize that if it is
one of these alternative instances of the free will problem about which one is theorizing, this
difference ought to be highlighted. Indeed, we would do well to remember that such alternative
formulations, as interesting as they may be in their own rights, are at some remove from the main of
the philosophical tradition which, stretching back to at least the Epicureans, has been principally
concerned with the responsible agency version of the free will problem. So, if we are to understand
the ‘semi’ of semicompatibilism as flagging some concession to incompatibilists on one of these other
versions of “the” free will problem, then all we need to clarify things is a specification of which
alternative free will problem the concession was intended. In the absence of any such clarification,
we should assume that what is at stake is moral responsibility and free will understood as a capacity
tied to moral responsibility. If so, though, I see no reason to think actualist compatibilism or
semicompatibilism is anything other than an instance (albeit a very powerful instance of)
compatibilism of a general sort that includes the work of P.F. Strawson and Harry Frankfurt.
Fine, one might think. But, is revisionism vulnerable to a similar complaint? That is, is
everyone really a revisionist of some or another sort, thus rendering the distinction between
revisionism and nonrevisionism a specious, or at least trivial distinction? Fischer and McKenna each
have flagged their willingness to revise the conditions for appropriate application of a concept, if not
the concept itself. And, McKenna has gone on to ask, in light of this, whether all philosophers are in
some sense revisionist. The short answer is yes, there is some sense in which all philosophers are
revisionist, but it is not the sense in which I have been discussing.
There are three points relevant here. First, for familiar enough Quinean reasons, I do not
find the distinction between a concept and its conditions of application a particularly compelling
one, or one that gains us much in the way of explanatory utility. Second, McKenna is calling
attention to a matter distinct from the focus of my concern. Recall the distinction between concepts
and conceptions. Every distinct philosophical account represents a distinct conception of
responsibility. Each of these is an articulation, refinement, or development of some broad
commitments implicit in a more general concept that is widely shared within a given linguistic or
conceptual community. What McKenna seems to be noticing is this: Conceptions are more detailed
than concepts, and as such, there is a sense in which any philosophical account counts as a
refinement or, if you insist, a revision of some folk concept. Call this sense of revision conceptionist
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revision. However, my focus is on something distinct: conceptual revision. So yes, while there is a
sense, the conceptionist sense, in which every philosopher is engaged in some form of revision,
moderate revisionism of the sort I propose is explicitly conceptual revisionism, a thing less common
than the conceptionist revision McKenna rightly suggests is common to philosophical theories.15 A
third point on this matter: we should not run together at least three varieties of revisionism that
might plausibly thought to arise in the case of conceptual revision: weak, moderate, and strong.
Weak revisionism is no revision to the concept itself but only to our confused beliefs we had about
our concept. This is a position common to many strands of compatibilism, advocating a shift in our
avowals, or self-understanding. It is a kind of revision that aims to align our second-order beliefs
with our first order commitments on freedom. Thus, it is only an ersatz conceptual revision, or a
minor form of conceptual revision at best. In contrast, moderate revisionism is a change in the
concept itself, a change in the first order commitments, one where the concept can be rightly said to
persist across the transformation. Strong revisionism is conceptual elimination or wholesale
replacement. My project has been to motivate moderate revisionism about free will and moral
responsibility.
Lack of methodological clarity has sometimes led some compatibilists to speak as though
they were moderate revisionists about some or another aspect of responsibility and free will.
Whether and how such compatibilists should be classified is no easy matter, but to the extent to
which classical compatibilists have been revisionists, they seem to have been overwhelming weak
revisionists (Vargas, 2005a; Vargas, 2005b). I take it that hard incompatibilists and hard determinists,
when they are not fictionalists, are strong revisionists. So, in short, there is some sense in which
compatibilists like Fischer and McKenna are revisionists: trivially, in the conceptionist sense, and
less trivially but perhaps misleadingly, if we mean weak revisionists in the conceptual sense.
Finally, I wish to remark on McKenna’s observation that my moderate revisionism— and,
indeed, many non-eliminativist accounts of free will— is committed to a kind of realism. This is a
matter I do not directly address in Four Views on Free Will, but it is one I have tried to address in
other places (Vargas, 2005a; Vargas, 2004). Briefly, here is how I take things to stack up.
First, I am hesitant to agree that my account, or others like it, are indeed committed to free
will realism, simply because philosophical discourse over realism is fraught with disagreement about

Elsewhere, I have offered a taxonomy of a wide range of possible varieties of revisionism, and distinguished my own
brand of moderate revisionism from several alternative varieties, including several possibilities I do not mention here
(Vargas, 2005a). For usefully related discussions, see also recent work by Shaun Nichols 2007)
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what, exactly, realism comes to. So, for example, in various places I have helped myself to
characterizing talk of responsibility and free will as truth functional. This is a matter of convenience.
Given that moral responsibility —and by extension, perhaps, free will— count as moral predicates,
everything I say should be translatable into any adequate non-cognitivist account, if noncognitivism
about moral terms is correct. So, if noncognitivism is true and my account were translated into a
discourse that makes explicit sense of that architecture of meaning, it would be a bit strange to insist
that the result would be a theory committed to problematic realism about moral responsibility.16
Second, even if we accept the idea that there must be a commitment to something realist here,
I have argued that it may make no practical difference if what we refer to is not free will in some
strict sense, just so long as it is otherwise a twin of free will with respect to its social, conceptual, and
normative roles (Vargas 2005a, Vargas 2004). Against those species of anti-realist views that I have
called property error-theoretic views (e.g., Pereboom’s), I have maintained that they face a special
explanatory burden. The burden is this: if we can demonstrate the obtaining of something else that
does virtually all the same work as some purportedly non-existing X, the error-theorist must account
for why it matters that he or she has an argument for the non-existence of X.
Let me explain. Even if it turns out that the positive account I offer is not an account of free
will, for perhaps Pereboom is right that free will, strictly speaking, does not exist, it does not follow
that some very close analog, free will*, also fails to obtain. Indeed, on this account, we have an
excellent candidate for free will*: namely moral considerations-sensitive capacities. Now here’s
clincher: (1) if free will* does everything we want of free will (e.g., it preserves the bulk of inferences
licensed by the concept, its presence would warrant characteristic moral evaluations and its absence
warrants the suspension of those reactions— recall the bit I noted earlier about these things being
the anchors for any proposed revision), and (2) it has the virtue of existing, then (3) it seems like we
would do well to abandon any concern for free will and move on to the theoretically and
existentially superior business of keeping track of free will* (Vargas, 2004). And, I submit, that is
exactly what my notion of moral considerations-sensitive agency permits us to pursue in the face of
non-existence claims.

How this rendering of my account would intersect with talk on the freedom or ability condition of responsibility, i.e.,
free will, is a complicated matter. One might think responsibility talk is noncognitive even if, for example, it appeals to a
(perhaps) truth-functional concept of free will. And, of course, there is the further matter of how we should understand
the semantics of free will, something that on my account may yet turn out to be internalist or externalist in its semantics
(Vargas 2005a).
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So, maybe anti-realism about free will is warranted. If so, though, it is not clear that such a
possibility has practical consequences, given that we have a good case for realism about free will*,
that is, an account of something that can do virtually all of the important work of a theory of free
will.
Now, as things stand, I do not think there is good reason to favor an account of the
semantics and reference of free will that would result in an antirealist interpretation of free will.
Elsewhere I have argued that we are better off adopting something like a Lewis-style functional role
specification of the denotation of the term, permitting the possibility of richly incompatibilist
connotational content that does not settle the matter of successful reference (Vargas, 2004). Instead,
I have suggested, reference here is plausibly settled by whatever instantiated property (or properties)
does the best job of making true the vast majority of platitudinous ascriptions in which free will is
implicitly or explicitly invoked, while preserving characteristic patterns of inference and licensing of
normative judgments.17 And, I believe, my account is an account of exactly the sort of thing plays
precisely this functional role.
So, I have indeed directly argued against anti-realist accounts of free will. However, even if
antirealism about free will remains plausible, its consequences are comparatively minimal. What we
would find, I submit, is that antirealism about free will to be as worrisome as, say, antirealism about
caloric turned out to be. Caloric was thought to be a fluid or gas that flowed from hotter to colder
bodies. Once we had a viable theory of heat, however, a theory that did all the work that made us
concerned about caloric in the first place, it was not really worrisome to concede the nonexistence
of caloric. So, although we cannot rule out the possibility of antirealism about free will, I do think
the heat is on antirealists to explain why we should be concerned about the possibility antirealism in
the face of viable alternatives that do all the principal work that drove us to worry about this sense
of free will in the first place.18
One virtue of my account is that it just is the application of a much broader story about how to think about the
rational constraints on language use. It is not as though we suddenly ignore general rules about concept usage or the
achievements we’ve made in understanding philosophical issues about language. Nor do we commit ourselves to a
picture where we treat the concept as unique and sacrosanct, off in its own insulated space of conceptual and logical
constraints, detached from the world and our purposes. I have said more about this picture in (Vargas, 2004), although
there I do not there emphasize the preservation of characteristic patterns of inference and licensing of normative
judgments, partly because I was assuming (rightly or wrongly) that such things would automatically embedded in the
structure of platitudinous ascriptions of freedom and responsibility.
18 I wish to thank Joseph Campbell for organizing the APA session that led to this paper. Thanks also to my co-authors
of Four Views on Free Will, as well as Richard Holton, Michael McKenna, and the indefatigable Dan Speak for fruitful
discussions and exchanges about the material in this paper. I also wish to acknowledge the feedback from audience
members at the 2008 Pacific Division Meeting of the APA. And, I am grateful for the generous support of the Radcliffe
Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard, where I completed work on this paper.
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